Is Sex Comedy or Tragedy? Directing Desire and Female Auteurship in the Cinema of Catherine Breillat by Ince, Katherine
 
 
University of Birmingham
Is Sex Comedy or Tragedy? Directing Desire and
Female Auteurship in the Cinema of Catherine
Breillat
Ince, Katherine
DOI:
10.1111/j.0021-8529.2006.00237.x
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Ince, K 2006, 'Is Sex Comedy or Tragedy? Directing Desire and Female Auteurship in the Cinema of Catherine
Breillat', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 157-164. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-
8529.2006.00237.x
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
INCE, K.  
Is Sex Comedy or Tragedy? Directing Desire and Female Auteurship in the Cinema of 
Catherine Breillat 
 
Published in 
Thinking Through Cinema: Film as Philosophy 
Murray Smith , Thomas E. Wartenberg (Editors)  
ISBN: 978-1-4051-5411-6 
June 2006, Wiley-Blackwell 
 
Is Sex Comedy or Tragedy? Directing Desire and Female Auteurship in the 
Cinema of Catherine Breillat 
 
Over the last few years the films of Catherine Breillat have run the gauntlet of critical 
reaction, from condemnation as pornography dressed up as art cinema to acclaim for the 
audacity required and displayed by her uncompromising depictions of sex acts and 
female sexuality. Breillat has become a well known cinéaste and novelist (some of her 
films are translations of her own novels to the screen), but has been less credited as a 
theorist, despite the philosophical character of interviews such as ‘The Absolute Opacity 
of Intimacy’1 and texts such as the preface to the screenplay of Romance (1999).2 She 
states in the latter, for example, that what she holds dear is ‘making a moral cinema’, but 
that morality in cinema is to be found not in the morality of the acts filmed, but in the 
moral dimension of the director’s regard [look] (Breillat 1999: 8, 18). Breillat’s 
contribution to feminist philosophy has already been noted, however, in a recent essay by 
Anne Gillain: ‘In effect, what Breillat advocates is a symbolic reappropriation of a 
feminine realm that for centuries has been dissected by the imaginary of men’ (Gillain 
2003: 204).  
    In this essay, I want to draw out the philosophical implications of Breillat’s depictions 
of sexualities and sex acts in order to set out the female auteurship I think is proposed by 
her film making. In arguing for Breillat’s auteurship as the ‘symbolic reappropriation of a 
feminine realm’, I shall be drawing in particular on the theoretical writings of Judith 
Butler and Luce Irigaray. 
    As my title suggests, specific meanings of ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’ are in question in 
this exploration of Breillat’s contribution to feminist philosophy. The understanding of 
‘tragedy’ I shall use is Judith Butler’s, outlined at the end of the section of Part 2 of 
Gender Trouble entitled ‘Lacan, Rivière and the Strategies of Masquerade’, where Butler 
sums up a lengthy analytic description of Lacan’s concept of the Symbolic order as ‘This 
structure of religious tragedy in Lacanian theory’. Most of the paragraph is quoted below, 
since it sets up the first parameter of my discussion of Breillat. 
 
What plausibility can be given to an account of the Symbolic that requires a 
conformity to the Law that proves impossible to perform and that makes no room 
for the flexibility of the Law itself, its cultural reformulation in more plastic 
forms? The injunction to become sexed in the ways prescribed by the Symbolic 
always leads to failure and, in some cases, to the exposure of the phantasmatic 
nature of sexual identity itself. The Symbolic’s claim to be cultural intelligibility 
in its present and hegemonic form effectively consolidates the power of those 
phantasms as well as the various dramas of identificatory failures.  The alternative 
is not to suggest that identification should become a viable accomplishment. But  
there does seem to be a romanticization or, indeed, a religious idealization of 
‘failure’, humility and limitation before the Law, which makes the Lacanian 
narrative ideologically suspect. (Butler 1990: 56, emphases added). 
 
Butler expands on this interpretation of the Symbolic by describing it as a ‘dialectic 
between a juridical imperative that cannot be fulfilled and an inevitable failure ‘before 
the law’’ [that] recalls the tortured relationship between the God of the Old Testament 
and those humiliated servants who offer their obedience without reward’. This 
romanticization or religious idealization of humility is then glossed as Lacanian theory’s 
‘structure of religious tragedy’ (ibid.). This structure of religious tragedy ‘undermine[s] 
any strategy of cultural politics to configure an alternative imaginary for the play of 
desires’ (Butler 1990: 56). Cultural politics is prevented from aiming at an alternative 
imaginary or an alternative Symbolic by a certain ‘structuralist legacy within 
psychoanalytic thinking’.  The critique of the Lacanian Symbolic Butler begins in Gender 
Trouble is expanded to some extent in Bodies That Matter, in 1993, and even more so in 
Antigone’s Claim3 (2000). There, Butler identifies this structuralist legacy as being 
behind the ‘“position” talk within recent cultural theory’, a genesis often not known to 
those using that theory (Butler 2000: 18). This legacy in Lacanian and therefore feminist 
film and literary theory is the legacy of Levi-Strauss, and Levi-Straussian structuralist 
anthropology. It interdicts social and cultural change in the same way that structuralist 
theory revealed and exerted its separation from history and narrative. The Symbolic order 
of Lacanian theory can impose itself (it should be added, as Butler does, that whether it 
does this depends on who is speaking or whose pen is writing) with the force of a law that 
‘guarantees the failure of the tasks it commands’ (Butler 1990: 56-7). Its purposes are 
perhaps ‘not the accomplishment of some goal, but obedience and suffering to enforce 
the “subject’s” sense of limitation “before the law” (ibid: 57). Like Butler, I shall be 
arguing here against the force and absolutism of Lacanian Symbolic law. But my 
argument goes beyond Butler in that I shall be using her critiques of the Lacanian 
Symbolic to outline a trajectory critical of psychoanalytic film theory. This trajectory will 
in many ways run parallel to the critiques of psychoanalytic film theory and its 
‘subjected’ subject formulated by cognitive and other film theorists from 1988 on.4 
    Since I want to argue that Breillat’s films have achieved and are achieving the female 
Symbolic envisaged by feminist theorists of the 1980s and 1990s, I shall now remain 
with recent commentary on the concept of the Symbolic order, but focus on its guise as a 
(or ‘the’, clearly an important use of the definite article) female Symbolic. For some time 
now, a female Imaginary and a female Symbolic have been positive goals set by feminist 
writers not just for theory, but for society and all the cultural representations that help to 
constitute and sustain that society. These goals can be associated particularly with the 
work of Irigaray, and from a British point of view, with books such as Margaret 
Whitford’s Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (1991) and Teresa Brennan’s 
edited Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis (1989). 5 Whitford in fact concentrates 
more on the construction of a female Imaginary than a female Symbolic, but these two 
things are envisaged and argued as inseparable and mutually dependent (Whitford 1991: 
76, 91). The route to a female Symbolic in Irigaray, however, depends on its proposed 
construction out of an un- but to-be-symbolized maternal-feminine best evinced by the 
mother-daughter relation and female genealogies. Chapter 4 of Whitford’s Luce Irigaray: 
Philosophy in the Feminine is entitled ‘Maternal Genealogy and the Symbolic’, and  she 
prefaces the section of the chapter called ‘The mother-daughter relationship’ by stating 
that representations of a maternal line or genealogy are ‘the major and most significant 
absence in the symbolic’ (Whitford 1991: 76). 
    Irigaray’s and Whitford’s line of argument can be counterposed to Butler’s suggestion, 
in Antigone’s Claim, that a deconstruction of existing symbolic structures may be a better 
route to take than the construction of partially existent, excluded, or invisible ones. 
Butler’s suggestion of this alternative route comes when, in a recognizably Derridean 
move on a linguistic performative, she identifies the utterance ‘[But] it is the law!’ as that 
which attributes to the law the force that the law itself is said to exercise. This utterance is 
‘a sign of allegiance to the law, a sign of the desire for the law to be the indisputable law, 
a theological impulse within the theory of psychoanalysis that seeks to put out of play 
any criticism of the symbolic father, the law of psychoanalysis itself’ (Butler 2000: 21). 
‘Thus the status given to the law is precisely the status given to the phallus, the symbolic 
place of the father, the indisputable and incontestable’ (ibid.). This statement should 
perhaps be read more as an implication of how the symbolic place of the father may be 
undone than a suggestion that it should be. Butler proceeds carefully, using rhetorical 
questions to imply that accepting the law as a final arbiter of kinship life is ‘to resolve by 
theological means the concrete dilemmas of human sexual arrangements that have no 
ultimate normative form’ (ibid.). 
    The theoretical analysis accompanying Butler’s reading of Antigone (Sophocles’ play 
and the readings of it made by Hegel, Irigaray and Lacan respectively) can be set 
alongside the discussion in Gender Trouble that leads up to her identification of the 
structure of religious tragedy in Lacanian theory. In ‘Lacan, Rivière and the Strategies of 
Masquerade’, Butler extracts two very different tasks (a term carrying important 
theoretico-political weight) from Lacan’s analysis of Joan Rivière’s famous essay 
‘Femininity as Masquerade’. Here, she says, “On the one hand, masquerade may be 
understood as the performative production of a sexual ontology, an appearing that makes 
itself convincing as a “being”; on the other hand, masquerade can be read as a denial of a 
feminine desire that presupposes some prior ontological femininity regularly 
unrepresented by the phallic economy” (Butler 1990: 47). 
    In the next paragraph Butler is already concluding that these two ‘alternative 
directions… are not as mutually exclusive as they appear’, but first, she suggests that the 
first task would ‘engage a critical reflection on gender ontology as parodic 
(de)construction and, perhaps, pursue the mobile possibilities of the slippery distinction 
between “appearing” and “being”’ (ibid.). In my reading of Breillat’s cinema, I shall 
engage just such a critical reflection. By concentrating on the gender ontology that 
appears to govern feminine and masculine sexual identities in Sex Is Comedy (2002), I 
shall reveal the masquerade that is producing it. Sex Is Comedy, and especially the scene 
of ‘deflowering’ of the Actress (Roxane Mesquida) by the Actor (Grégoire Colin), 
appears to deal in fixed sexual identities. But the fact that a prosthetic and not a real penis 
is worn by the Actor for this scene is the clue to the fact that something quite different is 
going on – that the phallic mastery that would deflower the Actress is a masquerade, an 
‘appearing that makes itself convincing as a “being”’ (op. cit.). Pursuing the 
philosophical possibilities of the distinction between “appearing” and “being” in Sex Is 
Comedy in this way will return me, first, to tragedy and to comedy, since Butler states 
that exploiting the potential of the distinction between appearance and being is ‘a 
radicalization of the “comedic” dimension of sexual ontology only partially pursued by 
Lacan’. (Presumably, what Butler means by this is that her own work on the subversive 
or parodic activities of drag and cross-dressing gives much more attention to the cultural 
comedy of sexual ontology than Lacan ever did.) 
 
II 
 
Sex Is Comedy is, first and foremost, a self-reflexive meditation on Breillat’s working 
methods as a director, and particularly as a director of explicit sex scenes: the film being 
shot, Scènes Intimes, resembles Breillat’s previous film A ma soeur! (2001). In its self-
reflexivity Sex Is Comedy bears a resemblance to Truffaut’s La nuit américaine (1973) 
and a stronger one to Abbas Kiarostami’s Through the Olive Trees (1994), itself a 
meditation on his And Life Goes On…(1992). In a sense the film is an autofiction,6 in 
which the central character is Breillat’s fictional incarnation Jeanne, impressively played 
by Anne Parillaud in what the actress herself says was her best experience of being 
directed since Luc Besson’s 1990 film Nikita (Frappat and Lalanne 2002: 36). Breillat’s 
interviewers in Cahiers du cinéma call it self-portraiture (ibid: 34), and Breillat herself 
says ‘To begin with, I thought I would be making a film like La nuit américaine. I didn’t 
imagine the dimension of self-portraiture’ [Au départ, j’imaginais tourner un film comme 
La nuit américaine. Je n’imaginais pas cette dimension d’autoportrait’ (ibid: 37)]. In my 
view, however, Sex Is Comedy is not a conventional autofiction, not any kind of 
autobiography – which Breillat says she hates (ibid: 36). The film does not concentrate 
on the character resembling Breillat, as a conventional autofiction would do, and its 
narrative is limited to one episode, the shooting of the film Scènes Intimes. The aspects of 
Breillat it reveals and draws out are her desire to direct and the agency with which she 
does so – the investment she has as a creative artist in cinema, and the transformation of 
her wish to convey explicit sex to audiences intelligently. This is confirmed particularly 
at the end of the film, when the central, most taxing scene of Scènes Intimes is ‘in the 
can’, and Jeanne is relieved and happy, even reservedly jubilant, and is pictured 
energetically and warmly embracing Roxane Mesquida, also her leading actress in A ma 
soeur! 
    Breillat has noted that Sex Is Comedy‘is also a comedy in the ‘comic’ sense of the 
term’ [est aussi une comédie, au sens comique du terme (Frappat and Lalanne 2002: 37)]. 
(She thus distinguishes between a comedy of laughter and ‘comedy’ as an activity 
involving fictional representations, the sense drawn on by Butler when she refers to the 
‘comedic’ dimension of sexual ontology.) The comedy of laughter may not be the 
primary sense of the word as it figures in the title of Breillat’s film, but as she says, she 
did mean this sense to be included. Which it certainly is when the Actor in Breillat’s 
scène intime trots around the set waggling the prosthetic penis manufactured for him by 
the props manager in order to defuse the tension created for the entire crew by intense 
acting and filming, since the crew all laugh hilariously. (Colin wears the prosthesis both 
to maintain an erection and to ensure no skin contact with Roxane Mesquida, so in 
contrast to Romance, where audiences and critics speculated that sex was really going on 
between Caroline Ducey and Rocco Siffredi, Breillat’s fictional representative assures 
them here that it is not.) Laughter also arises spontaneously in the opening ‘beach’ scene 
of Sex Is Comedy from the misery of two scantily clad actors and an entire crew trying to 
create an atmosphere of oblivious sexual passion in a freezing Atlantic wind. To bring 
out the feminist theoretical implications of Breillat’s play with literary or dramatic genres 
in her films up to Sex Is Comedy, I shall now briefly review the structure of tragedy in 
three of her earlier films, Une vraie jeune fille (1976), 36 fillette (1987), and Parfait 
Amour! (1996). 
    Une vraie jeune fille and 36 fillette are Breillat’s two studies of adolescent femininity, 
both pervaded by an atmosphere of confinement and attempted rebellion against the 
confinement through underage sex. The languours of Alice’s (Charlotte Alexandra) 
summer vacation with her parents on a rural smallholding in Une vraie jeune fille are if 
anything exceeded by the pain, mistrust and wild behavior of Lili (Delphine Zentout) in 
36 fillette, clearly linked to undermining treatment by both her parents and physical abuse 
by her father. Breillat’s tragedies of female desire reach their apogee in the searing irony 
of her title Parfait Amour! It has become something of a cliché to link men’s violence 
against women to their often socially sanctioned desire to maintain power over them, but 
the violent death met by Fredérique (Isabelle Renauld) as her affair with Christophe 
(Francis Renaud) is briefly and rather desperately revived a while after it has ended 
remains Breillat’s most brutal illustration of the power structures women can suffer. The 
sense of limitation ‘before the law’ characterizing life in the tragic Lacanian Symbolic is 
lived out in the claustrophobic structure of Parfait Amour!, in which an erotic 
relationship is presented as Fredérique’s only route to fulfillment as a woman, and a 
sense of destiny if not fate hangs over the action. Fredérique does not see her tragedy 
coming, but the film is identified as the tragedy of her self-destructive passion for 
Christophe by its presentation in flashback. The film opens with the police taking a numb 
Christophe through the reconstruction of the crime, followed by a sequence in which 
Fredérique’s teenage daughter confirms the couple’s mutual passion and her mother’s 
powerlessness to escape from her relationship with her younger lover. 
    In Romance, both tragic and comic modes are present. Breillat says that in the opening 
scene ‘where you see Paul (Sagamore Stévenin) all powdered up like a geisha, posing for 
a fashion shoot in a matador costume, it’s funny’ (Sklar 1999: 25) that he has to be on the 
tip of his toes to play the man. Gender identity is revealed to be performed in its 
‘essence’, and comically so. On the real set of Romance, as on the fictional set of Sex Is 
Comedy, the crew laughed at the actors amid what is probably the most emotionally and 
dramatically intense scene in the film, the second of the two bondage scenes, of which 
Breillat says ‘But the really funny scene is the second scene of bondage with Robert 
(François Berléand), that I call the “bondage in the red dress” scene. I did it intentionally. 
On the set we were roaring with laughter. That’s the way I wrote it. I wanted people to be 
able to think that a scene as weird as one about bondage and sadomasochism could be 
cheerful and convivial’ (ibid.). 
    We can now extend and deepen this examination of the interplay of comedy and 
tragedy in Romance and Sex Is Comedy to Butler’s double reading of masquerade’s part 
in sexual ontology. The opening shots of Romance, where Paul models a matador, show 
that masquerade in Breillat’s cinema relates to masculine gender roles and identities as 
much as to feminine ones. A more significant instance of masquerade, however, occurs in 
the scenes with Grégoire Colin’s prosthetic penis, where it is the phallus ‘itself’, signifier 
of the ‘indisputable and incontestable’ law of the father, whose ontological status is 
contested. The phallus as masquerade is the point in Sex Is Comedy at which Breillat 
decisively opens up the distinction between appearance and being of masculinity, in order 
to question the meaning and authority of the sexuality that is ‘taking’ the virginity of an 
adolescent girl. The few scenes of Sex Is Comedy where the masquerading phallus is 
actually visible reveal Breillat’s deconstruction of the symbolic structures of 
phallocentrism, a realization in images of what I suggested above is a Butlerian route to 
an Irigarayan female Symbolic. The scene in which Grégoire Colin comically offers his 
prosthesis to the assembled crew performs the ‘“comedic” dimension of sexual ontology’ 
Butler finds undeveloped in Lacan, and exposes the mobility of the relationship between 
female auteur and male actor. This relationship is open to performative reconstruction, 
and by means of a close reading of the relationship between Jeanne and her unnamed 
male lead, I now want to link Breillat’s performative cinema to the Irigarayan theory of a 
female Symbolic, and to the theory of female auteurship that emerges from Breillat’s 
mise en scène of female directing in Sex Is Comedy. 
    In Speculum of the other Woman, Irigaray lists a number of types of female behavior 
that she claims can be seen as ‘manifestations of a lack of an auto-erotic, homo-sexual 
economy’ for women (Irigaray 1974: 126, Whitford’s translation). What women do not 
have is a libidinal economy prohibited by the phallocentric Symbolic: in other words, 
under phallocentrism, women’s desire cannot circulate as effectively as men’s can. As I 
set out earlier when referring to Whitford’s reading in her chapter ‘Maternal Genealogy 
and the Symbolic’, Irigaray’s preferred argument for countering the negative effects of 
the phallocentric Symbolic on women’s sexuality is the development of a ‘homo-sexual’ 
(same sex) economy among women, an economy to be constructed  out of female 
genealogies and the mother-daughter relationship. But Whitford also refers to another 
way of changing current sexual economies for the benefit of women’s sexuality described 
by Irigaray: this is to create an economy ‘of the death drives’ (Irigaray 1974: 126, 
Whitford’s translation), the mobilization of which is currently prohibited ‘for/in female 
sexuality’. Women’s ‘nature’ has been constructed by a particular symbolic organization, 
in which it is ‘used’ for the representation and sublimation of men’s death drives, but is 
unable to sublimate or represent itself. 
    A phallocentric symbolic economy allows the representation and sublimation of men’s 
death drives, but not the ‘rechannelling, metaphorization or sublimation’ (ibid.) of 
women’s. The concept of the death drive is specific to psychoanalysis, but here I am 
calling upon it to make an argument about sociosymbolic organization, not about the 
psyche.7 As Whitford says, Irigaray’s critics read her as if she were offering an 
alternative psychoanalytic theory, when in fact she is ‘interrogating psychoanalytic 
conceptualization itself’ (Whitford 1991: 84). ‘Lacanians take Irigaray to be talking about 
feminine specificity at the level of the drives, whereas I take her to be talking about 
feminine specificity at the level of the symbolic, or representation’ (ibid: 85).8  
    A redistribution of the death drives of men and women would create at least the 
conditions of possibility for a female Symbolic. As Whitford states, the concept of the 
death drive is conceptualized differently by different psychoanalytic theorists, but its 
association with (self-)destructive impulses, with the drive to repeat and to return to 
immobility, and with sadism and masochism (phenomena pertinent to the sexualities of 
Breillat’s cinema), means that the fundamental question involved is one of happiness and 
unhappiness, and to what degree these states are caused by social and psychic factors. ‘Is 
it the fault of society or is there something inherent in the human psyche which is an 
obstacle to happiness? Most people would probably say ‘both’, but it is hard to determine 
with any precision what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’’ (Whitford 1991: 95). I would 
endorse both parts of this estimation, which means that a reorganization of symbolic 
economies by means of a redistribution of the death drives entails broaching the large 
topic of the relationship of the psychic to the social. My contention, though, is that 
Breillat’s representation of the directing of desire in Sex Is Comedy offers a mise en scène 
of this relationship – or if not of the relationship of the psychic to the social in its entirety, 
which can probably only be addressed discursively by philosophers and theorists, then of 
the enacting of desire (of the drives) in a context where the activity is representation, and, 
importantly, artistic representation of which a woman is in charge. 
    To see this, consider that from the start of filming in Sex Is Comedy, Jeanne is limping 
around the set due to a foot injury that has put her foot in plaster. The injury is shrouded 
in mystery and apparently symbolic of Oedipally disadvantaged femininity, since when 
asked, Jeanne says it is not she that has broken her ankle, but her ankle [pied] ‘that broke 
itself. It’s the metaphor of the film’ [qui s’est cassé tout seul. C’est la métaphore du film.] 
As I have already emphasised, the focus of drama in Sex Is Comedy is the filming of 
scènes intimes between the Actress and the Actor. Interspersed with Jeanne’s instruction 
of her actors in the movements and gestures that will produce the emotion she wants, 
however, are a series of tête-à-tête conversations with the Actor in which she coaxes, 
cajoles and bullies him into a convincing performance. In these dialogues she is 
outspoken to the point of being insulting, and tyrannically insistent on sex being acted as 
she sees it. She bans ‘male larking about’ [plaisanteries d’homme] from the sacred place 
that is her set, refuses the Actor’s own interpretation of himself as ‘timid’, and lambasts 
the ‘moral ugliness’ [laideur morale] of an actor who performs with his body but not 
with his soul. The Actor is subjected to a demeaning comparison with the Actress, to 
which he retorts that she is no good [nulle], and that he is only interested in himself as a 
unique individual. This is precisely the sort of male egoism Jeanne will not indulge, and 
although she continues to respond to the Actor’s pleas for attention (she frequently puts 
her arm around his waist or shoulders and walks off into the wings with him to talk things 
through), she will not engage in any flattery of his narcissism. She complains to her 
assistant director Leo (Ashley Wanninger) that the Actor is ‘arrogant… terribly arrogant’ 
[orgueilleux…atrocement orgueilleux], and, when the Actor apparently tries to sabotage 
the smooth running of the deflowering scene by turning Jeanne and her leading lady 
against one another, claiming that the Actress won’t perform nude since it isn’t in her 
contract (in the event she complies uncomplainingly), Jeanne tells him he is egoistic, 
vain, irresponsible and lacking in professional conscience. The Actor has said several 
times that he only puts up with Jeanne’s authoritarianism because he is getting well paid, 
and now she throws his words back at him: ‘Actors are very well paid for what they do 
because it’s very hard. There, that’s it’ [Les acteurs sont très bien payés pour ce qu’ils 
font parce que c’est très dur. Voilà.] 
    The clashes between Jeanne and her male lead are an important dramatic focus of Sex 
Is Comedy, but as I have already suggested, they also illustrate the politics of desire 
represented in Breillat’s mise-en-scène of female directing. Jeanne’s foot injury 
symbolizes the disadvantage Breillat sees women directors as suffering by virtue of their 
sex, and Jeanne’s passionate and often selfish involvement in her film (to prepare for the 
shooting of the deflowering scene, she expels the entire crew except Leo from the 
bedroom set for an hour-and-a-half, to allow her the solitary concentration she says artists 
and writers like her need) reveals iron will and determination. The character played by 
Grégoire Colin displays the anti-authoritarian attitude Breillat’s fictional persona needs as 
a foil, but although some explanation for this is offered when the Actor mentions that his 
step-mother beat him as a child, he is in many ways an Everyman figure with the added 
sensitivity one would expect of an actor, a beautiful man who on this occasion must act 
out a woman’s vision of male sexuality. The dialogues and relationship between Jeanne 
and the Actor have an unmistakably symbolic – even an allegorical – dimension. Far 
more than just a reenactment of a ‘war of the sexes’, they show uninhibited female 
aggression towards a male ‘artist’, an altered sexual economy in which the desire of a 
woman director is successfully sublimated, and finds its expression in the realization of 
her film. As will be clear by now, I am suggesting that Sex Is Comedy dramatizes the 
altered economy of the death drives called for by Irigaray in Speculum of the other 
Woman. Feminine sexualities under the sway of the death drive have figured more than 
once in Breillat’s cinema, and particularly in the person of Marie (Caroline Ducey), the 
masochistic female protagonist of Romance. In Sex Is Comedy Breillat has achieved a 
rare degree of reflexivity about the relationship of female sexuality to artistic creation (in 
this case, film directing). The relationship between female director and male actor that 
occurs in this context may well draw on Breillat’s own experience of directing, but 
whether it does or not, is fascinatingly suggestive about uncharted routes of women’s 
desire. Rather than offering a general theory of female auteurship, it demonstrates how 
women may achieve auteurship, via an ‘autofictional’ mise-en-scène of Breillat’s own 
direction of desire that viewers can recognize from her previous film. 
    The conclusion I wish to draw about Breillat’s cinema, one illustrated particularly by 
her self-reflexive meditation on woman as director Sex Is Comedy, is the following. First, 
although Breillat herself and some of her commentators often describe her characters’ 
sexualities as ontologies of femininity or masculinity, and thus in very essentialist terms,9 
the gender identities shown in her films can be articulated along very different lines. 
Images of what Butler calls ‘the “comedic” dimension of sexual ontology’ show that the 
films themselves undermine this essentialism. Using Butler’s theory of gender 
performativity to interpret masculinity as masquerade in Romance and Sex Is Comedy, 
along with a discussion of Breillat’s bleak depictions of women’s experience of sex that 
draws on Butler’s critique of the Lacanian Symbolic, has allowed me to pursue a reading 
in which I have knowingly eschewed the Irigarayan approach to the masquerade Butler 
suggests is essentialist.10 I have, however, turned to Irigaray’s notion of a female order of 
representation – a female Symbolic order – in order to develop my reading of the type of 
auteurship I think is constructed by Breillat’s film making. Through her fictional persona 
Jeanne, Breillat shows women’s film directing to be a tussle and a struggle involving an 
altered sexual economy, a redistribution of men’s and women’s death drives that allows a 
female director’s desire to be successfully sublimated in the creation of her film. Second, 
I have illustrated how Breillat’s cinema engages in a manner that has not been observed 
elsewhere with the literary modes of tragedy and comedy, in the specific senses given to 
the terms by Judith Butler, but also more broadly, since Butler herself draws upon 
literature to arrive at her definitions. Breillat’s films often include stylistically intense 
mise en scène, but she is also a highly literary film maker, as shown in her deployment of 
tragic and comic registers, and by my reading of the narrative and central relationship of 
Sex Is Comedy. Breillat’s contribution to film as philosophy is thus a feminist and literary 
mode of philosophizing that plumbs the ‘essences’ of sexualities, exposes their 
thoroughgoing constructedness, and suggests new and different reconstructions of gender 
relations. 
 
Filmography 
 
A Real Young Girl/Une vraie jeune fille, 1976 
Nocturnal Uproar/Tapage nocturne, 1979 
36 Fillette, 1987 
Dirty Like an Angel/Sale comme un ange, 1991 
Perfect Love!/Parfait Amour!, 1996 
Romance, 1999 
Fat Girl/A ma soeur!, 2001 
Brief Crossing/Brève Traversée, 2001 
Sex Is Comedy, 2002 
Anatomy of Hell/Anatomie de l’enfer, 2004 
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